為什么貨幣貶值沒有對巴基斯坦造成嚴重的后果

第一章:介紹

概述
 

本文旨在找出貨幣貶值和巴基斯坦這樣的國家之間的關(guān)系,貨幣貶值是歸于全球經(jīng)濟類的術(shù)語。貶值,指相對于黃金的價格或其他國家的貨幣來說貨幣價值的大幅度下降。旨在通過石油銷售增加政府收入，而石油銷售占政府收入的一半以上。通過貶值貨幣,政府試圖在當?shù)刎泿胖匈崈杀兜氖杖?這將使得產(chǎn)生更多的社會支出。政府官員也承認,貶值可能導(dǎo)致更高的通貨膨脹，銀行的不良資產(chǎn)已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)移到政府的資產(chǎn)負債表當中。貨幣貶值的好處包括制造業(yè)活動和就業(yè)的暫時增加,貨幣
貶值常常是政治家和經(jīng)濟管理者準備下屆選舉的一種簡單的方法為,而不是為了經(jīng)濟的長期健康發(fā)展。
 

當盧比從2008年6月的62盧比比1美元下降至2009年6月30日80.7盧比比1美元，大家認為最壞的時候已經(jīng)過去了。

 

Why Devaluation Was Not Fruitful For Pakistan

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

 

Overview

 

The thesis was carried out to find out the relationship between devaluation and a country like Pakistan, devaluation was buzz word due to global economy. Devaluation, a substantial drop in the value of a currency, relative to the price of gold or the currency of other countries, aimed to increase government revenue from oil sales, which accounted for more than half of government income. By devaluing the currency, the government tried to earn double the revenue in local currency, which could allow for more social spending. Government officials also had recognized that the devaluation could likely cause higher inflation. Banks toxic assets had been moved to government’s balance sheet. Benefits of currency depreciation included temporary increase in manufacturing activity and employment, devaluation was an easy way out for politicians and economic managers often looking towards the next election, not the long-run health of the economy.

 

When the rupee fell from Rs 62 to a dollar in June 2008 to Rs 80.7 on June 30, 2009, was assumed that the worst was over. But further dropped by another five per cent in the next six months to Rs 85 and the slide were still on. Economic experts pointed out that Pakistan was the only major country facing pressure on the currency. Indian rupee for instance appreciated by three per cent from Rs 47.78 decreased by a dollar on July 1, 2009 to Rs 46.23 on January 22, 2010. Bangladesh taka was at Rs 68.87 on July 1, 2009 and was later traded at Rs 69 against the dollar. The benefits of lower oil prices (from $140 per barrel to current $75 per barrel) had been absorbed by high

 

rupee devaluation and had provided marginal relief to the consumers.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

The huge trade and current account deficits accompanied by heavy government borrowing were the main reasons for regular devaluation of the currency. Governments allow the currencies to devalue through imprudent economic policies. Devaluation caused contraction in economic activities but promoted smuggling as black- market transactions in foreign exchange continued, massive devaluation of the rupee had encouraged brain drain from the country. People had accepted even lower salaries abroad because even from lower savings people could send more money in rupees to the dear ones in Pakistan. Pakistan could lose heavily both as seller and as a buyer.

 

The loss from devaluation was greater than the gains. Real income could decrease at the same level as the percentage of devaluation. The government was stimulating the economy through the budget deficit, but in order to do that was necessary to borrow funds. The influence of the state budget on the economy overall had grown significantly. In order to keep the volume of state orders at least at the same level, financial resources were required. Pakistan financial situation had stabilized after the last borrowing, but still in the regular international market that was much, more expensive for Pakistan to borrow than from the international lenders. The alternative, to borrowing in the international market, was even more unpleasant, because then there was higher interest rates and a more expensive credit service. If financial resources were not borrowed, then that became necessary to reduce the state budget deficit directly, or through the instrument of devaluation, could had brought about great change in the economy, which could stimulate activity and growth in certain sectors, apart from increasing country’s foreign debt servicing liabilities, the rupee had fallen more than 25 percent from 2008 to December 2009 putting a negative impact on the economy and adversely affecting all sectors including business and consumers.

 

If the government could not take action to control the depreciation of the currency, people could face a new wave of price hike, depreciation of the rupee made business and industrial sector, manufacturing, and agriculture activities expensive. Only the import of petrol had witnessed an increase of 274 percent in November to December 2009 as compared to the same period of last year due to low refineries production and reduced availability of CNG.

 

If the trend continued, the rupee could come further under pressure as the country was experiencing falling exports and increased imports. Continuous power and gas suspension to the industry had squeezed the possibilities of producing export surpluses due to which the country face a decline in foreign exchange earnings in next days, which could further plunge the rupee down. Therefore the government must devise a comprehensive strategy to overcome power problems and increase exports. 1 solution of enhancing exports was to encourage investment. Many sectors of the economy including power offer great opportunities for local and foreign investors and the government could take all possible measures to ensure complete security as investors needed absolute security of the capital. General factors leading to devaluation, persistent adverse trade balance and disequilibrium in balance of payment were the main cause, which compelled a country to devalue the currency.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Problem Statement

 

The problem was to analyze the impact of devaluation on economy. The thesis showed a causal relationship between effects of devaluation, capacity utilization (output) during stabilization in Pakistan having significant positive effect on output.

 

1.3 Hypotheses

 

Hl: devaluation was significantly linked to real exchange rate.

 

H2: devaluation in 1 year could cause devaluation in next years.

 

1.4 Definitions

 

Devaluation.

 

Reduction in official values of a currency in relation other country.

 

Exchange Rate.

 

Rate of one currency, used in exchange of other currency

 

Capacity utilization rate.

 

The fraction of country's production capacity, which was really used for a time also called operating rate.

 

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

 

Applegate (1990) devaluation was suggested for Zambia by IMF because the foreign exchange was used on works that had more return to improve export over import, the long run impact could raise real output and employment. The outcomes of empirical studies had been uncertain with some resulted in a positive impact of devaluation whereas others wind up opposite. Devaluation compact output in the short run, improved output after 1 year, but were neutral in the long run. The contractionary effects of devaluation, if present, were depended on structural rigidity in the economy. Thus, were more likely present in the short run than the long run. Devaluation was considered as a measure designed to correct balance of payments, problems in the average rather than the short run. The extent and course of the impact of devaluation depended mostly on the extent of replacement of domestically created inputs for imported inputs and domestic labor for imported capital. Since Zambian industry was greatly depended on imported intermediate inputs and capital, was operating at less than full capacity. That entail increase in real output, was obtained in the short run without capital investment. Long-run growth depended on either further import of capital goods, which was persistently limited by a harsh shortage of foreign exchange, or replacing other inputs for capital and highlighted less-capital-intensive sectors. First, almost all government borrowing was from the central bank resulting in the lack of alternative markets for government debt. That involved government deficits mechanically increased the money supply. Second, markets for equities and commercial paper were non present, forcing the firms to finance fixed and working capital by short-term bank credit or retained earnings. A third option for firms was to obtain loans from the "unofficial money market. The magnitude and direction of the effect of devaluation on real GDP depended on several factors, first, in percentage terms; the absolute magnitude of the effect of devaluation on real GDP was less at higher initial values of the exchange rate. Second, the greater the trade deficit the smaller became the impact of devaluation on real GDP until that eventually became negative.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Reinhart (1995) in the majority devaluation events the real exchange rate did in fact responded significantly to a nominal exchange rate shock, at least in the short run. The real effects in continual high-inflation countries was much less, there were major real effects 1 year after the devaluation; the effects, seemed to erode completely beyond the third year. In low inflation economies with a practice of a fixed exchange rate, the real effect of the devaluation was even longer-lived.

 

Sen (1996) the suggestion of a non-expansionary devaluation was better than contractionary monetary and fiscal policies unnecessary for devaluation to 'stick', because investments in traded goods sector slowed down, move to the latest and more export oriented economic structure brought with that 'ex-change rate adjustments'. 1 reason of devaluation was the presence of primary balance of trade deficit. A good devaluation was expansionary if not checked could decrease the initial positive effect of the devaluation.' the contractionary policies were planned to include domestic inflationary tendencies, so that enough time was available for resources to pour into the traded goods sectors, in response to the devaluation-induced growth in the comparative price of traded to non-traded goods. Devaluation from an early position of deficit was contractionary as a result of the initial trade 'disequilibrium', and no other requirement was required.

 

Fleming (1978) the impact of inflation on Tort Compensation in some periods the rate of devaluation had been unusually high and quite clear of all reasonable expectation, producing the difficulty especially of long-term creditors that had no mean of cutting the losses.

 

Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) working countries devaluated and gained competitiveness at the expense resorted to protectionist policies to strengthen the balance of payments and limit gold losses. An independent monetary policy addressed the deepening slump, used trade restrictions to shift demand toward domestic goods and stemmed the rise in unemployment. In contrast, countries that discarded the gold standard, let the currencies to depreciate, saw the balances of payments fortify Countries abandoning the gold standard early, as Britain experienced comparatively mild recessions and quick recoveries. Countries lingering on the gold standard, such as France experienced prolonged fall. Countries send-off the gold standard were able to loosen up monetary policy, while countries staying on gold were forced to keep up tight monetary policies that reserved recovery. The German government depended on foreign loans to finance the expenditures, and the freshening up of those loans caused a run on the mark and a loss of gold reserves. The government was forced to impose strict controls on foreign exchange transactions. That meant that devaluing could have had devastating effects on the public finances.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Reinhart, Carmen, Kaminsky, Graciela and Vegh (2002) the devaluation of a currency or a declaration of default, were capable of starting an immediate unfavorable chain reaction, usually included sharp declines in equity prices, an increase in the rate of borrowing in intercontinental capital markets, and a major plunge in the accessibility of funds. A devaluation in a given country was expensive (in output) for additional countries to keep hold of the parity. In that setting, devaluation in a second country was a procedure decision whose effect on output was useful.

 

Connolly and Taylor (1976) devaluation raised domestic prices and as a result increased the demand for money, thereby leading to a temporary improvement in the balance of payments. The rate of devaluation was considered as the fraction raise in the local currency price of the dollar. With following character: 1. Export and import prices increased very a little preceding to devaluation at about the similar rate, but wholesale and consumer prices increased at a faster but nearly identical rate. 2. In the year subsequent devaluation, the prices of exports and imports rose significantly, whereas consumer and wholesale prices increased at a faster rate than before but at a slower rate than the prices of traded goods. 3. During the second year after devaluation, all prices rose at about the same rate. 4. Over the entire 2-year period after devaluation, the prices of exports and imports rose at a bigger rate than wholesale and consumer prices, and that increased in the relative price of traded goods was enough to cure the relative decline in the price preceding devaluation. Devaluation in developing countries emerged quite flourishing in improving payments imbalances; that frequently served the second purpose of dismantling exchange controls. The level to which devaluation was thriving depended in large part upon the monetary policy practice along with the change in the exchange rate. The related fact that exchange controls were frequently relaxed following devaluation,

 

Pastine (2000) the system had any reason to try to expect an expected hit by devaluing before that happened. Speculators could attempt to forecast the defensive devaluation and use that through the foreign currency purchases. In equilibrium, the central bank could intentionally introduce uncertainty about the timing and size of the devaluation, making that difficult for speculators to guess the conditions under which that could alter the exchange rate policy, the central bank could evade a speculative attack. The move before not analyzed. That meant that exchange rate uncertainty was in actuality an important aspect of fixed exchange rate system. Exchange rate uncertainty was established endogenously and intentionally by the monetary authorities in an effort to avoid speculative attacks. That sanctioned an investigation of finest devaluation policy in the countries without perfect capital controls. The model had a constraint which confined some type of capital controls, and was revealed that with tough enough capital controls the stability collapsed to a rule for the central bank, and work with ideal capital controls. However, with less difficult capital controls the equilibrium was qualitatively unlike as the central bank actively tried to evade speculative attacks.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Himarios (1987) argued that exchange rate effected and controlled inflation rate prices increased to some percentage of devaluation to bring equilibrium in value, only if nominal and real prices were flexible; could face resistance from some factors of production. The effects of devaluation on the price level were felt for at least three years while adjust exchange rate, devaluation was considered inflationary. In the long run, domestic prices rose by the full amount of a devaluation. The active response of prices to exchange rate changed through wage-price dynamics. Wage-price linkages were such that in the long run the system was fully neutral the predicted '"longer-run consequences" could have occurred within a time horizon of two or three years'. If, in contrast, devaluation was started from a position of disequilibrium i.e. an unclear set of relative (traded to non-traded, domestic to foreign) prices, the efficiency was judged by whether that helped or delayed the process of adjustment towards stability. If devaluation was broadcasted quickly and to the full level into domestic prices, not only was that hopeless as a stabilization tool, but that could even was measured destabilizing since that introduces extra unnecessary shocks to the adjustment course. If devaluation was predictable or delayed and with changes made in monetary and fiscal policy could elevate current wage demand, level of current price, inflationary pressure, hence real exchange rate could overvalue and horrible effect on trade balance as hording up of importable goods for more capital gain. Countries (Finland, Ghana, India, Israel and Spain) devaluations were either over forecasted and/or had been anticipated for a period of two (Spain, Israel) to five years (Finland, Ghana, Spain) before the actual devaluation occurred. The ex post effects of devaluation on the price level were stretched out in most cases over a period of three years. The first-year result appeared relatively small (roughly 1-third) in contrast of with the cumulative effects. 2. Countries investigated were a devaluation fully reflected into prices within three years. 3. There was an extensive variety of experiences among countries that had experienced single or multiple devaluations. At 1 end of the spectrum, devaluation had an insignificant long-run affected on the price level; at the other end, devaluation raised the price level by a corresponding amount. 5. When devaluation was predictable, that had major effects on the price level even before that was made successful.

 

Child (1968) the rupee remained overvalued, and exchange control continued to defend the balance of payments. The main reason was being promotion of saving, investment, and economic growth through (1) controlling the volume, composition, and terms of international transactions according the limits compulsory by market conditions-and (2) changing the domestic structure of prices, share of resources, composition of output, and distribution of income. Pakistan's control system was broad complex, and discriminatory based on goods being traded, effective import rates of exchange, for export permitting taxes and subsidies, the lowest effected rate for agricultural exports and more manufacturing got highest effective rates, plus payment of effective rates was different. The State Bank could have set up subordinate that limited imported goods exchange rate under aid or bartered contract as some exporters got bonus vouchers, reduced uncertainty in foreign trade because of unpredictable exchange rates. When the importer made the purchases, the government received revenue equal to the rupee cost of the goods (at the official exchange rate) and incurred an equal dollar debt (at the official rate). (b) Scheduled banks were given "sub authorizations" against which to issue letters of credit for aid-eligible merchandise. A merged market could had required a single bonus voucher price; barring the unlikely case in which the effective rates of exchange were equal in the two separated markets, a unified price could create an inequality between aid flows and aid imports, i.e., the accumulation of unutilized aid (or the misuse of aid) or the import of expensive aid-type goods against Pakistan's own foreign exchange earnings. Since accumulation of unutilized aid funds was undesirable, since Pakistan could not buy expensive, aid-subsidized goods with the own foreign exchange earnings, and since country-discriminating regulatory duties were contrary to international agreements, the continuing practice of tying aid gave Pakistan no alternative to the maintenance of a separate market for aid goods.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Edwards and Montiel (1989) devaluation shock, following adjustments required degree of overshooting of the macro variables was magnified by postponement. The effect of the timing of change was that the practical pattern of continuously decreased black market premiums, decreased inflation, and increased current account deficits was definitely inferred only in the circumstance of adequately postponed adjustment. The suggestion was that "devaluation crises" episodes in developing countries had resulted not from the occurrence of domestic or external shocks, but from a disappointment to adjust quickly in response to such shocks. The vast majority of devaluation crises had been lead by loose and incompatible macroeconomic policies. In particular, the evidence showed that fiscal policy in the devaluing countries as a group was significantly more expansive than in a control group of fixers. Some collapses could have been caused by exogenous external shocks. In the period prior the devaluations a major real exchange rate appreciation; the reduction of the stock of international reserves; a decline of the current account deficit; and a decrease in the ratio of net foreign assets to money. Devaluation crises had been followed by very sharp increase in the black market premium. Immediately following the devaluation the premium experienced a significant decline. For real wages, the facts was less clear. In some countries, real wages could have followed an inverted-U path. Mostly improved in the years previous the crises and dropped in the years that followed. The relationship between the timing of the devaluation and the magnitude was not linear. If the rescheduling period was doubled, the required scale of the devaluation could not double. "Devaluation crises" episodes in developing countries had resulted not so much from the occurrence of domestic or external shocks, but from a failure to alter punctually in response to such shocks.

 

Zaidi (1995) there were necessities for devaluation because of the broadening of the trade gap, the decrease of foreign exchange reserves and the increasing inflationary pressures, the recent devaluation of the Indian rupee. The trade and current account deficits had both been diminishing over the last few years. The trends for the two deficits, which were very strongly associated to the exchange rate, had been decreasing, foreign exchange reserves had been increasing constantly. Inflation decreased and had affected the real exchange rate, which evaluate the inflation rate in exporting and importing countries. A high inflation in 1 trading country against the other involved a declining real exchange rate and thus the requirement to devalue the nominal exchange rate to make goods more aggressive. Devaluation for Pakistan was inflationary and worsens further an already explosive price situation

 

Oskooee and Hegerty (2007) risk-aversion amongst traders that discourage the volume of a country’s exports, ideal forward markets might have decreased the effect. Forward markets could not adequately develop, and traders were uncertain of how much foreign exchange to wrap. Increased exchange-rate instability might have the conflicting effect and amplify the volume of trade. Under very broad conditions, a firm might gain from increased instability and thus increase the volume of the exports. Also showed that instability could increase trade, as those enlarge the probability that the price a trader receives might surpass trade costs. Hypothesis that increased volatility increased the worth of exporting firms, thus encouraging exports used an asset-market approach to explain a positive effect. Volatility increased the value of a trader’s choice to export; since the risk increased the possible gain from trade, the volume of trade could rise accordingly. An argument put forward by the antagonist of the floating exchange rates was that such rates brought in uncertainty into the foreign exchange market, which could discourage trade flows.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Mendoza (1995) terms-of-trades hocks accounted for nearly 1/2 of actual GDP variability. 1) Terms-of-trade shocks were huge, determined. 2) Net exports-terms of trade correlations were low and positive, and independent of terms-of-trade autocorrelations. 3) Cycles were larger in DCs, but all countries had similar variability ratios, autocorrelations, and GDP correlations. 4) Real exchange rate fluctuations were large.

 

Minot (1998) devaluation increased the manufacture of tradable goods and decreased demand of that, resulted in contraction of economy; increase in inflation. The distributional impact of devaluation effected more to household that consumed more imports than, fewer consumers of goods. Similarly devaluation had negative impact on urban than rural household. Within each sector, more adverse impact on high-income than on low-income households as rural and poor income people had less input in economy. The results were less applicable where a significant portion of the poor were wage-earning employees, such as countries with a large plantation sector. In cases where the staple was tradable, the net sales position of poor households in rural areas became a critical issue.

 

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS

 

3.1 Method of Data Collection

 

Since devaluation measured as capacity utilization which was not usually measured therefore the availability of the data could had been a constraint but the issue was resolved by applying the formula to calculate capacity utilization.

 

The data was based on thirty years starting from 1979 till 2009, collected from SBP’s, Federal Bureau of Statistics’ website. For the purpose of data collection thesis was based on two variables but mostly upon capacity utilization.

 

3.2 Sample Size

 

A sample size of 30 cases was used, containing a dependent variable and an independent variable.

 

3.3 Statistical Technique

 

For the purpose of data collection the thesis was based on two variables. Regression analyses and autocorrelation were carried out keeping in view the nature of the hypotheses and the data.

 

The regression did a good job of modeling capacity utilization. Approximately 86% variation in capacity utilization was explained by the model 1

 

Adjusted Rsquare in that case was 86.4% showing that the IV i.e. real exchange rate, accounted for 86.4% variance in the DV and that showed that almost all the variation in real exchange rate was explained by the model

 

The adjusted R-square compensated for model complexity to provide a more fair comparison of model performance.

 

Durban Watson value was more than 2 thus there was autocorrelation among the variables and cases.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

 

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH.

 

5.1 Conclusion

 

To make interpretations on the results of the analyses of the data was somewhat problematic due to the small sample size. That was unfortunate for the realm of academia and could expect a number of years to pass before a really significant study was found. Some doubt was cast upon the generalization of those results given the large sized Pakistani economy. That perhaps defended the validity of the data somewhat against the doubt cast by the small sample size.

 

5.2 Discussions

 

Foreign-exchange rates only cannot verify competitiveness. Pakistani inflation rate with other countries was considered. A currency could was destabilized, but the benefit was then compensated by high inflation. The devaluation affect was felt for the next seven years on economic factors like inflation, fiscal deficit, circular debt, interest rate, taxes. Government had to find a way of guide decrease Pakistan's reliance on donors and to recover economic self-reliance.

 

5.3 Implications and Recommendations

 

The section could discuss the presentation of the results and the implications on the capacity utilization and the relationship with the independent variable. The regression did a good job of modeling capacity utilization as the result showed that real exchange rate when devaluated in any time of the year could bring a decrease around 86% in capacity utilization of Pakistan each year, the autocorrelation function proved that the devaluation in 1 year could have the effect for the consecutive seven years, thus the capacity utilization could keep on decreasing or tapering for the next years or until unless no further devaluation occurred in between.

 

5.4 Future Research

 

Early empirical studies relied on simple methods such as Ordinary Least Squares to evaluate the effects of exchange rate volatility, but the paper according which the thesis was carried out followed 2sls technique, incorporating distributed lags to capture dynamic effects. As time series analyses, rather than simple regression, because more popular, co-integration analyses were introduced to time-series econometrics, economists were able to avoid many of the problems – such as “spurious correlations” – created by relying on an overly simple technique such as OLS. Thus, the progressive refinement of econometric technique was apparent. Future thesis on capacity utilization dealing with the determinants like trade flows was explained based on gravity models and those based on income and substitution effects Future thesis that concentrated on introducing new measures of volatility or refining the existing measures, were recommended. Second, certain modifications of the determinants of trade flows, such as incorporating third-country effects, also had not been incorporated in the majority of studies. Thus, simplified models were most common, often using income, relative price, and exchange rate volatility as determinants. Because of foreign exchange controls in many less-developed countries, there was a black market for foreign currencies in those countries, the only co-integration and error-correction method that allowed some of the variables to be non-stationary and some to be stationary were the bounded testing approach that were highly recommended as future studies relied on those methods.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Considering the autocorrelation function output, the autocorrelation model was used to measure the impact of devaluation for the next 7 years on Pakistan economy. Although both models like regression and autocorrelation were of substantial empirical and analytical interest, therefore were models for future thesis.

 

REFERENCES

 

Applegate, Michael J. (1990). A Nonlinear Multisectoral Simulation Analysis of Devaluation and Import Substitution in Zambia. The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 24, No. 4 pp. 543-556.

 

Bae, Kee-Hong., Karolyi, G. Andrew., & Stulz, René M. (2003). New Approach to Measuring Financial Contagion. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol.16, pp. 717-763.

 

Child, Frank C. (1968). Reform of a Trade and Payments Control System: The Case of Pakistan. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 539-558.

 

Connolly, Michael., & Taylor, Dean. (1976). Testing the M1tary Approach to Devaluation in Developing Countries. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 84, No. 4, Part 1, pp. 849-859.

 

Cost of Devaluation, (1998). Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 28, p. 1784.

 

Edwards, Sebastian., & Montiel, Peter J. (1989). Devaluation Crises and the Macroeconomic Consequences of Postp1d Adjustment in Developing Countries.

 

Eichengreen, Barry., & Irwin, Douglas A. (2009). The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: That Succumbed and Why? Working Paper 15142.

 

Fleming, John G. (1978). Impact of Inflation on Tort Compensation. The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 51-70.

 

Himarios, Daniel. (1987). Devaluation, Devaluation Expectations and Price Dynamics. Economica, New Series, Vol. 54, No. 215, pp. 299-313.

 

Mendoza, Enrique G. (1995). The Terms of Trade, the Real Exchange Rate, and Economic Fluctuations International. Economic Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 101-137.

 

Minot, Nicholas W. (1998). Distributional and Nutritional Impact of Devaluation in Rwanda. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 379-402.

 

Morley, Samuel A. (1992). On the Effected of Devaluation During Stabilization Programs in LDCs .The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 21-27.

 

Oskooee, Mohsen Bahmani., & Hegerty, Scott W. (2007). Exchange rate volatility and trade flows: a review article. Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 211-255.

 

Pastine, Ivan. (2000). Devaluation of Fixed Exchange Rates: Optimal Strategy in the Presence of Speculation. Economic Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 631-661.#p#分頁標題#e#

 

Reinhart, Carmen M. (1995). Devaluation, Relative Prices, and International Trade: Evidence from Developing Countries. Staff Papers - International M1tary Fund, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 290-312.

 

Reinhart, Carmen, Kwasinsky, Graciela, Vegh, & Carlos, (2002). Two Hundred Years of Contagion. Journal of Economic Perspectives.

 

Sen, Pronab. (1996). Cooper's Contractionary Devaluation Hypotheses: A Note. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 30, pp. PE75-PE79.

 

Staff Papers - International M1tary Fund, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 875-903.

 

Zaidi, S. Akbar. (1995). Why Devaluation Won't Helped. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 44, pp. 2789-2790.