Balance of Payments Policies: The Structural Approach國(guó)際收支政策：結(jié)構(gòu)的方法運(yùn)用

The structural perspective結(jié)構(gòu)的角度

The structuralist approach to the BOP has its roots in the protest by development economists inthe 1950s and 1960s against the uncritical application of neo-classical trade theory to LDCs. 國(guó)際收支平衡表的結(jié)構(gòu)主義它起源于20世紀(jì)50年代和20世紀(jì)60年代，它是對(duì)最不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家提出的新古典貿(mào)易理論的進(jìn)行的抗議下產(chǎn)生的。
Itrepresented not only an alternative way of looking at the BOP within the context of LDCs, but itbecame associated with a broader opposition to neo-classical economics and the post-war monetarists.In more recent years, however, a ‘structural’ approach has been applied to developed countries and inparticular the UK, as both an implicit critique of both the traditional approach and the monetaristapproach to the BOP. The leading exponent of this school of thought in the context of DCs has beenThirlwall.Structuralists essentially believe that structural imbalances in the economy are the source of BOPproblems. These imbalances in turn arise from the fact that growth and development involve adiscontinuous process of structural change.http://ukthesis.org/ibm

The structuralist adjustment mechanism“結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整機(jī)制

In developed countries the problem might originate in an inability to shift resources away from goodswhich are no longer competitive internationally and into new goods for which the prospects appearmore promising. In this case it is the structural characteristics of goods on the supply side of themarket which is causing the imbalance rather than a lack of competitiveness relating to price factors.What makes these structural imbalances more important is the fact that price adjustment, includingvariations in the exchange rate, is weak and unable to eliminate the disequilibrium. In this sense boththe traditional and monetarist adjustment mechanisms are insufficient to cure BOP problems arisingfrom structural imbalances in the economy and their associated polices are ineffective. For example,devaluation or depreciation of the currency can only be a temporary panacea which makes countriesmore competitive in the short run in goods with a given set of characteristics which were the source ofthe BOP problem in the first place!Structuralists perceive a direct link between the BOP and domestic growth such that growth may beconstrained by the BOP. In the context of developed countries, the BOP constraint may arise in thefollowing way. The crux of the problem is that the country is trying to achieve internal balance and atthe same time to grow fast enough to compete with other developed countries. Unfortunately,supply bottlenecks occur in particular sectors which push the BOP into deficit and necessitate acontraction of domestic growth. The source of structural imbalance lies in the characteristics ofimports and exports.Structuralists pointed to two alternative problems. Firstly, if the country’s export goods may not havethe necessary characteristics to satisfy foreign demand, then the income elasticity of demand (theresponsiveness of demand to changes in income, EYDXUK) will be low and export receipts in thoseproducts will not grow fast over time. This underlying problem may not reflect a lack of price competitiveness so much as an inability to compete on non-price grounds. For example, the productsmay be inferior in quality, after-sales service may be poor and so on.Alternatively, the second source of the problem may be a high income elasticity of demand forimports (EYDMUK). This could be caused by a dependence on imports of raw materials and energysources such as oil, or because domestic consumers prefer foreign goods such as cars and consumerelectrical’s to similar goods produced domestically.#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#

Alternatively, the second source of the problem may be a high income elasticity of demand forimports (EYDMUK). 另外，第二個(gè)問(wèn)題的根源可能是來(lái)自于一個(gè)高收入彈性的需求（HEDMUK）。This could be caused by a dependence on imports of raw materials and energysources such as oil, or because domestic consumers prefer foreign goods such as cars and consumerelectrical’s to similar goods produced domestically.For these reasons the BOP may act as an effective constraint on growth, since in the long-run acountry cannot grow faster than the rate of growth consistent with equilibrium in the current accountof its BOP.1In other words, if a country gets into BOP difficulties before it has reached domestic fullcapacity, then demand has to be contracted and investment curtailed. This may further exacerbate thecountry’s long-run BOP position if it results in slower productivity growth and export goods becomeeven less attractive to foreigners. Thus, a viscous circle can occur.因此，粘性循環(huán)可能發(fā)生。

Thus, the maximum growth rate the UK economy (  YUK) can sustain, whilst maintaining internal andexternal balance = 2.6%. Hence there is a constraint of maintaining BOP equilibrium, therefore theUK economy can only grow at half the world rate!

One important and unfavourable side-effect of BOP-constrained growth may be to encourage aprocess of de-industrialisation and a shrinkage in the manufacturing base. This can occur if thegrowth in manufacturing output which is constrained by the BOP is less than the rate of productivitygrowth.
This will imply that labour is being shed in some sectors of the economy at a faster rate thanthe economy can absorb it elsewhere.
這將意味著在某些經(jīng)濟(jì)部門(mén)的勞動(dòng)力是以更快的速度前進(jìn)著，更是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了其他經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)輻射到的地方。
The trend towards increased non-oil visible trade deficits hasoften been interpreted as evidence of a general lack of competitive edge in UK industry relative toforeign industry. Related evidence is provided by the progressive decline of the UK’s share of thetotal exports of manufactured goods of the major industrial countries, and by the increased importpenetration of the UK market by foreign products. These trends have prompted fears of the imminentde-industrialisation of the UK, with the manufacturing base so eroded by foreign competitors that fullemployment and balance of payments equilibrium cannot, in the long run, be achieved simultaneously.These fears have been heightened, rather than quelled, by the development of North Sea oil and itsimplications for the adjustment of the economy. At the very least, the UK may begin to face a severebalance of payments constraint as North Sea oil is gradually depleted. The statistics of the decline inthe UK share of world exports of manufactures are dramatic and indicate that the share fell steadilyfrom 20.4% in 1954 to a low of 8.8% in 1974. Since 1974, however, the UK’s share of world trade inmanufactures appears to have stabilised at around 9%.On itself, the decline in export share need not give rise to concern, since it may simply reflecta decline in the UK share of world manufacturing production, the natural result of Britain’s earlyindustrial start. However, once it is recognised that during the 1960s and early 1970s, the UK wasalone among the major industrial countries in experiencing a drop in export share, there are groundsfor disquiet. Furthermore, the decline in the UK’s share in world manufacturing production may itselfreflect the same factors which hinder UK trade performance.此外，在世界制造業(yè)內(nèi)，英國(guó)的市場(chǎng)份額生產(chǎn)下降，可能本身反映了同樣的因素阻礙在英國(guó)的貿(mào)易。